Abstract-The authors consider a multirate code-division multiple acess system, in which all users have the same chip rate and vary their data rate by adjusting the processing gain. The receivers are assumed to be implemented using conventional matched filters, whose performance is sensitive to the received power levels. The authors' goal is to maximize the total system throughput by means of power control. A game theoretic approach is adopted. It is shown that for a certain type of pricing function, a unique Nash equilibrium solution exists and it possesses nice global properties. For example, it can be shown that for the optimal solution a high-rate connection should maintain a higher energy per bit than low-rate ones. The asymptotic spectral efficiency is also derived.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
PEECH provisioning, a low-data rate service, is the major objective of second-generation cellular systems. However, as the demand for wireless services proliferates, future wireless systems should be able to accommodate more diverse service types. Inherently, voice, data, and video services require different data rates. The bit rate requirement may range from a few kilobytes per second to as much as 2 Mb/s. For this reason, it is necessary to support multirate transmission in third-generation wireless networks.
In this paper, we consider the problem of providing multirate transmission using direct-sequence code-division multiple access (DS/CDMA). There are different ways to design a multirate CDMA system. The one to be examined here is called variable spreading gain access. In this method, the signals of all users are spread to the same bandwidth by keeping the chip rate identical. As a consequence, different data rates result in different spreading gains. In such a scenario, the traditional method of keeping the received power constant is inappropriate. Intuitively, a solution in which the energy per bit for all users is constant seems optimal. Indeed, we will show that in some asymptotic situations such a solution maximizes the system throughput. However, to achieve optimality in general, a high-rate connection should maintain a higher energy per bit than low-rate connections.
In the literature, power control studies tend to focus on devising algorithms to provide acceptable quality for all the connections (see, e.g., [5] , [10] , [11] , [16] , [17] ). This is usually translated into a minimum requirement on the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR). This formulation is suitable for voice traffic since there is dubious, if any, gain in user satisfaction to have improvement of the SIR beyond an acceptable threshold, commonly called the target SIR. For data traffic, however, the situation is different. Typically, a data packet in error needs to retransmit. A higher SIR reduces the number of retransmissions, thus minimizing the delay while maximizing effective throughput. So there is no natural way to determine a target SIR. In view of this, we consider a more relevant formulation, in which the total throughput is to be maximized. Some related studies can be found in [7] and [12] .
Recently, a game theoretic approach to the power control problem for data traffic has been offered in [2] , [4] , [8] , [9] , and [13] . The distributed power control problem is formulated as a noncooperative game. The fundamental difference between our work and previous works lies in the definition of the payoff function. In [8] and [9] , the payoff is defined through the bit error rate of a noncoherent frequency-shift keying (FSK) scheme. A drawback of this definition is that the payoff goes to infinity when a user transmits at zero power. This degenerate situation arises from the fact that one-half of the bits can still be received correctly even if one transmits nothing at all. To remedy this problem, the definition was modified in an ad hoc way in [8] and [9] . In this paper, we overcome this problem by using an information theoretic approach. We define the payoff as the reliable information rate through the channel [1] . When the transmit power goes to zero, the information rate through the channel also diminishes to zero. So, the degenerate case does not occur in our formulation. As a consequence of this change in the definition of the payoff function, one can obtain a generalization of the asymptotic result on the spectral efficiency of CDMA systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is described. In Section III, we introduce the game theoretic framework and define our game model. In Section IV, a pricing mechanism is described. In Section V, it will be shown that with pricing, the resulting Nash equilibrium has a nice global property. In Section VI, we will derive the resulting spectral efficiency, which is defined as the maximum number of bits per chip that can be transmitted reliably through the channel [14] . The spectral efficiency of a single-rate 1536-1276/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE CDMA system is derived in [3] . We show that a multirate system can achieve the same efficiency. In Section VII, the numerical results are presented. In Section VIII, conclusions are summarized.
II. SYSTEM MODEL FOR MULTIRATE CDMA SYSTEMS
We consider a single-cell CDMA system, in which there are active terminals. Terminal transmits its signal at rate . All users have the same chip rate , thus spreading their signal to the same bandwidth . We assume that is an integral multiple of and the processing gain of user is defined by . Let be the transmit power of terminal . The received power at the base station is , where is the attenuation factor.
Though our results can be applied to chip-asynchronous systems, we assume that the system is chip-synchronous for simplicity. Let be the data symbol of user and be the corresponding decision variable at the receiver output. When matched filter is used, the channel can be modeled by the following conditional probability 1 :
where is the bit energy of user , and is the interference spectral density defined by 2 (2) This channel is called a binary-input Gaussian-output (BIGO) channel. Its capacity is given by [15] (3)
where (4) and (5) If the output of the BIGO channel is hard quantized into two levels, then the channel becomes a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability (6) where (7) The channel capacity of a BSC is [1] (8) 1 Here, we have invoked the Gaussian assumption that y is Gaussian distributed. 2 If the signals are not chip synchronized, J =2, which represents the variance of y , should be defined as (T =3) Q + (N =2) [6] .
As a notational convenience, we define . Note that also equals where
Denote the interference power experienced by user by , that is,
It follows that (11) We define as the rate in bits per channel use at which information can be reliably sent through the channel [1] . In general, it is an increasing function of , while its explicit form depends on the modulation and coding scheme. Since user accesses the channel times per second, the corresponding information rate in bit per second is given by (12) We call the above term the throughput of user . The total throughput of the system, , is given by
By Shannon's channel capacity theorem, is upper bounded by or , depending on whether the channel output is hard quantized. In this work, we do not stick to a specific modulation and coding scheme. We assume that is either or . It can be shown that for these two forms of , the following conditions are satisfied (see Figs. 1 and 2 for a graphical illustration). 1) . In particular, we have for BIGO for BSC.
2) . 3) . 4) Let
. There exists such that for for for .
From Properties 1, 2, and 4, it is easy to see that (14) for some constant that is large enough. Numerically, we find that the above statement is true for BIGO if , and is true for BSC if . Though we consider these two forms of only, our results can be applied to other situations, provided that satisfies Properties 1-4. 
III. POWER CONTROL GAME
Generally speaking, our objective is to find a power vector which maximizes the total throughput. For practical reasons, it is most desirable if this can be achieved by letting each user adjust its power level, based on local information. This distributed operation fits well in a game theoretic framework proposed in [8] and [9] . We will first describe this framework. After introducing the terminology, we will construct a new game by defining the payoff function pertaining to our problem.
In a power control game, each mobile user is regarded as a player of the game. The strategy space of player is the interval . In practice, the power levels have finite ceilings. For theoretical study, sometimes we consider the case there is no upper limit on the power levels. In that case, s are equal to infinity. The joint strategy space is the Cartesian product of all the individual strategy spaces. Each player chooses a power level . The payoff function of player is denoted by . Occasionally, an alternative notation is used, where denotes the power vector of all users except user .
The power control game (PCG) can be formally expressed as (15) In a PCG, each user chooses an appropriate power to maximize his payoff. As there is no cooperation among the users, it is im- portant to ensure the dynamic stability of the system. A concept which relates to this issue is the so-called Nash equilibrium. Definition 1: A power vector is a Nash equilibrium if, for every user (16) A Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a stable solution, at which none of the users has the incentive to change its power. Many games have several Nash equilibria. To compare the qualities of two different solutions, a commonly used concept is called Pareto dominance.
Definition 2: A power vector Pareto dominates another vector if, for all (17) and for some
Furthermore, a power vector is Pareto optimal if there exists no vector which Pareto dominates . The above framework is established in [8] and [9] . A PCG is completely defined once the payoff function is specified. In this paper, we consider the game where the payoff of user is its throughput, that is (19)
To distinguish this game from that in [8] and [9] , we call it throughput maximization game (TMG). Note that the payoff of user depends only on , which is completely determined by the received power vector, . Without loss of generality, we treat s as our independent variables. The strategy space of user becomes where , and the joint strategy space is . Note that can be written as a function of (20) Furthermore, if . If there is no upper limit on the power levels (i.e., ), then given a positive vector, , a necessary and sufficient condition for is (21) We call this the feasibility condition [7] . If this condition holds, there is a one-one mapping between nonnegative and . Furthermore, the following equation always holds:
where . The following theorem states that a Pareto optimal solution must be located at the boundary of the strategy space for a power control game with bounded strategy space.
Theorem 1 (Pareto Optimality): For a TMG with finite upper power ceilings for all users, a power vector is Pareto optimal if and only if for some . Proof: Note that is a strictly increasing function of . If for all , one can scale up . The resultant s will all increase, thus improving the payoff of all players. Hence, cannot be Pareto optimal. Now consider a vector with for some . If is not Pareto optimal, we can find another vector which Pareto dominates . It implies that for all , and for some . Since , it follows that By adding 1 to both sides and simplifying
It then follows that for all , which leads to a contradiction.
Since is a strictly increasing function of , for any given . It is easy to see that the TMG has an unique Nash equilibrium, which is achieved by setting the power of each user to its maximum value. By Theorem 1, this Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In spite of this, this maximum power strategy may not be a good strategy from a global viewpoint. For instance, consider a user who is closest to the base station and requires only the lowest data rate. For the sake of other users, it is intuitively obvious that this user should not transmit at maximum power. Therefore, this strategy, though Pareto optimal, is not efficient from the system viewpoint. We consider a way to improve the system performance in the next section.
IV. PRICING MECHANISM
To find other strategies which improve the payoffs in a global sense, we use the method of pricing. This pricing mechanism can implicitly bring cooperation to the users, yet maintaining the noncooperative nature of the game. We let be the pricing function of player . The discounted payoff function is defined as
The following is called a power control game with pricing (PCGP) [9] : (24) PCGP is essentially the same as PCG, except with a different payoff function. To distinguish between and , from now on, we call the payoff and the discounted payoff of player .
This pricing methodology is first applied to PCG in [9] . However, it is worth noting that our purpose of using pricing is different from that in [9] . Due to different definitions of the payoff function, the PCG considered in [9] possesses a Nash equilibrium which is not Pareto optimal. Thus they use pricing to bring about a Pareto improvement. In the TMG, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Our intention of using pricing is to shape the users' behavior so as to improve the performance from a system viewpoint.
When a user transmits his information through the network, it causes interference to other users. To discourage this behavior, it is reasonable to charge the user some price for creating the interference. Intuitively, the pricing function of player should be a monotonic increasing function of his received power. Based on this argument, a linear pricing scheme is adopted in [8] and [9] . However, we suggest to normalize the received power by the total received power plus noise at the base station, that is (25) where is the pricing parameter. The rationale of normalizing the received power is that the harm caused by player is based not only on the received power of player , but also on the total interference at the base station. For example, consider the case . If , a large portion of the total interference is generated by user . However, consider another scenario where . In this case, the harmful effect caused by player is comparatively small. Thus, the impact made by player is more accurately measured by the normalized received power.
With this pricing function, the discounted payoff function becomes (26) Recall that is the interference experienced by user . We call this game the throughput maximization game with pricing (TMGP).
For the pricing mechanism to be effective, should not be too large or too small. To see this, we differentiate (26) When decreases from , increases strictly from zero for all . Consequently, by (20), all the s strictly increase from zero and approach infinity as tends to . Since the power control problem has finite upper bounds, there exists an unique such that for all , and for some . Since for some , by Theorem 1, the solution is Pareto optimal.
For this theorem to be valid, it requires for the BIGO model, and for the BSC model. From now on, we assume that this condition always holds, since this is a mild condition which is satisfied in almost all CDMA systems. Now we derive a property about the Nash equilibrium. Consider the case . From (30), it can be seen that (37) From (29), for any given , we have
Hence, we have proven the following. Theorem 3 (Unequal at the Nash equilibrium): If , then . We have established a pricing mechanism for the wireless network. The only global information needed is the pricing parameter and the total received power plus noise. Then the transceiver of each user can be treated as independent entities. Each receiver monitors the throughput and the received power of the corresponding user. The discounted payoff can then be computed and used to drive a close-loop power control algorithm.
V. GLOBAL PROPERTY
We have considered a family of games with pricing parameter . Now we show that playing this family of games is equivalent to solving a family of constrained optimization problems with parameter .
The following theorem shows that the Nash equilibrium has a nice global property.
Theorem 4 (Constrained Global Maximum on Total Throughput): For any
, the Nash equilibrium of the PCGP, , maximizes , subject to the constraint for some . Furthermore, is a strictly decreasing function of .
Proof: First consider the constrained optimization problem with parameter . With the equality constraint , there is a one-one monotonic mapping between nonnegative s and s (39) (40) Thus, it is legitimate to treat s as our independent variables. Furthermore, the equality constraint can be rewritten as (41) To solve the problem, we make use of the method of Lagrange multiplier. We define the Lagrangian (42) To maximize , the following equations must be satisfied: 
Thus, yields a constrained local maximum. Since is upper bounded by , a global maximum exists. Assume that the constrained global maximum of is attained at . Since the constraint is met, the maximum value of is independent of the value of . So, we can assume is chosen to be of Theorem 2. Note that can be written as (52) Since yields the global maximum, there exists such that (53) which violates the fact that the solution is Pareto optimal as guaranteed by Theorem 2.
Although the solution maximizes on the hyperplane , it may not be a global maximum over the whole strategy space, . Now we assume that the system is interference limited. We make the approximation that . Denote the maximal value of over by . We have the following result.
Corollary 1: When , for any . Proof: When , scaling a power vector has no effect on the vector . Thus, there is no loss of generality to restrict the strategy space into a hyperplane . Hence, by Theorem 4, is optimal.
VI. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we study a large-scale system in which the number of users, , and the bandwidth, , are both large. We assume that there is no upper bound on the power levels and the transmission rate of each user is bounded as follows: (54) Furthermore, we define the spectral efficiency, , as the total throughput per unit bandwidth,
We summarize our results in two theorems. Due to the bounding condition on , when , we must have . Hence, we obtain the value of (68) Theorem 6: The maximal spectral efficiency is given by for BIGO for BSC.
Proof:
We have seen that for large , for all . It is easy to see that the supremum of is (69) With this , the spectral efficiency can be simplified as follows:
The spectral efficiency for BIGO and BSC are plotted against in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively. Note that is a decreasing function of . It can be shown that the spectral efficiency is maximized when . Thus
for BIGO for BSC.
This maximal spectral efficiency is the same as that derived in a single-rate CDMA system [3] . Thus a multirate CDMA system, with any given rate vector , can achieve the same spectral efficiency as a single-rate system.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the effect of the pricing parameter, , on the total throughput, . For simplicity, we consider a single-rate system. The matched filter output is assumed to be hard quantized such that a BSC model applies. Assume that there are 20 users. Each of them transmits at rate Mb/s. The system bandwidth is 20 MHz. The noise power is normalized such that unity received power has a signal-to-noise ratio of 10 dB.
As we mentioned before, the effect of is to constrain the total received power . The larger the value of , the smaller the total received power . Fig. 5 shows the tradeoff between the power consumption and the total throughput. When , the total throughput grows at a high speed when is increased. This is because the thermal noise dominates in this region, and larger can reduce the effect of noise. When , the system becomes interference limited. Further increase in has little improvement and the curve levels off.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we define a new payoff function for the noncooperative power control game. A new pricing function which improves the system performance is introduced. With this pricing function, the game is shown to possess a unique Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this equilibrium is shown to maximize the total throughput over a hyperplane with fixed total power. The distance between the hyperplane and the origin can be changed by adjusting a pricing parameter, which is broadcasted by the system. Moreover, we have studied the system behavior under some asymptotic situation. When both the bandwidth and the number of users are large, the Nash equilibrium can be approximated by keeping the bit energy of all users constant. The resulting spectral efficiencies under the BIGO and the BSC model are derived.
